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I. Introduction
Some believe that the legacy of the 1960's can be summed up
in the mantra "sex, drugs, and rock n' roll." Yet the 1960's was also a
time of heightened awareness of consumer rights.' Energized by
Ralph Nader's crusade against automobile manufacturers, state
legislatures began to enact legal protections for consumers. 2 This era
has been appropriately dubbed the "heyday of consumerism."
3
Specifically, states enacted Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice
("UDAP") statutes.4 These UDAP statutes either specifically
borrowed the language of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA") 5 or copied the provisions
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
J.D., 2002, cum laude, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law.
Both authors acknowledge research help from Elyssa Schwartz, J.D., 2001, Nova
Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
1 See Michael C. Gilleran & L. Seth Stadfeld, Little FTC Acts Emerge in
Business Litigation, 72 A.B.A. J. 58, 58 (May 1986).
2 http://www.votenader.org/biography.html (last visited May 1, 2003).
3 J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law:
Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 356
(1992); see also Wayne E. Green, Lawyers Give Deceptive Trade Statutes New Day
in Court, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at B1.
4 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES 41 (5th ed. 2001).
' Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000)).
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6
of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. All of these
"borrowed" or "copied" state laws made unfair and deceptive trade
acts or practices illegal.7
The primary purpose of these state "little FTC acts" was to
protect "the public - that vast multitude which includes the ignorant,
the unthinking and the credulous." 8 However, unlike the FTCA, state
UDAP statutes provide for and encourage direct consumer redress by
granting consumers a private right of action. 9 Businesses could no
longer depend on the scarcity of federal government resources or the
lack of political will to shield them from consumers seeking redress
in the courts.' 0 Consequently, state UDAP statutes became a vital tool
for the protection of consumer rights.'
The effect of these "little FTC acts," however, was not limited
to protecting consumers. The UDAP statutes were not only designed
to deter unfair and deceptive trade practices by businesses against
consumers, but also to protect legitimate business from losing
customers to unlawful business practices. 12 For example, when either
a consumer or a business purchases "a stamp re-use it kit" for $19.95,
which contains only an eraser and a tube of glue, both the consumer
and the business should have rights under a state UDAP statute. Any
consumer or business that purchases the kit for use may be equally
cheated by the ploy. By prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade
practices, state legislatures sought to protect both consumers and
legitimate business, as well as to encourage fair competition among
businesses.' 3 This three-fold statutory purpose is grounded in the
Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") original charge to prohibit
6 Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to
Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1628
(1983) [hereinafter Toward Greater Equality]; see also UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 273, 273-80 & 318-21 (1999).
7 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer and Borrower Protection § 280 (2002).
8 Charles of the Ritz v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 143 F. 2d 676, 679 (2d Cir.
1944).
9 Arizona and Iowa are the only states that do not grant a private fight of
action.
'0 Franke & Ballam, supra note 3, at 356-57.
11Id.
12 Toward Greater Equality, supra note 6, at 1624.
'3 Gilleran & Stadfeld, supra note 1, at 58.
[Vol. 15:2
All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance
unfair competition. 14
This statutory scheme produced results. The 1960's consumer
protection movement is credited with creating a more educated
consumer. This "educated" consumer is more cautious of the "too
good to be true" deal, is more willing to assert legal rights, and yet is
also somewhat resigned to the occasional rip-off. Rather than
complying with consumer laws, many businesses have met the
"educated" consumer challenge by becoming more cunning, subtler,
and more innovative in using the marketplace for unlawful gain.' 
6
As businesses got better at disguising their unfair and
deceptive trade practices, a new sort of consumer emerged.17 This
new consumer includes small business owners, the sole proprietors,
and entrepreneurs.'
8
A typical commercial transaction today greatly differs from
the traditional notion of an arm's length bargain between two
knowledgeable, experienced, and comparably sized business
entities.' Large corporations make up only a small fraction of the
total number of businesses. 20 Today the typical business owner may
not be the distinguished looking middle-aged man who works in a
three-piece, gray, instriped suit from behind his mahogany desk in a
penthouse office. Rather, today's typical business owner may be
Charlotte, the twenty-two year-old university graduate who runs
Surfnet.com from her computer work station in her rental
apartment. 22 Small businesses, spurred on by the growth of the
14 See Franke & Ballam, supra note 3, at 355.
'5 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundation of Modem Contract
Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1974).
16 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 4, at 4.8.1. See In re Nat'l
Housewares, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 512 (1977); see also In re Holland Furnace Co., 55
F.T.C. 55 (1958), aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
17 See Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible Consumer: Towards A
More Sensitive Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. ILL. L. R. 571 (1989).
18 See id. at 583.
19 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 6, at 1627.
20 Id. at 1628.
21 Id. (indicating that in 1977, 97% of business had sales of less that
$1,000,000).
22 Id. at 1629 (stating that small businesses "are typically run by inexperienced
entrepreneurs who may be little more sophisticated than individuals in the
consumer marketplace").
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Internet, are "revolutionizing the business of business. 23
Today, the bright line that once separated consumers from
businesses is not so clear. The consumer in the context of consumer
protection laws is now not only the traditional consumer who
purchases goods or services for personal use, but also includes the
small business owner and entrepreneur who purchases goods and
services for commercial use. With this blurring of the line between
consumers and businesses, consumer laws that police the marketplace
need to be re-examined.24
The purpose of this article is to examine the ability of one
business entity to sue another business entity using state UDAP
statutes. Part II of this article will dissect the fundamental provisions
and prohibitions of state UDAP statutes. Part III will compare,
contrast, and discuss how various state UDAP statutes treat a UDAP
claim by one business against another business. The article will
conclude by supplying an answer to the question of whether the
1960's-based UDAP statutes are capable of protecting both
consumers and businesses.
II. The Anatomy of UDAP Statutes
The UDAP statutes of forty-eight states provide a private
right of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices.2 5 These little
FTC acts rely on the federal courts' and the FTC's interpretation of
26
what constitutes an unfair or a deceptive trade practice.The federal statute defining deceptive trade practices is
23 U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SMALL BUSINESS EXPANSIONS IN
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2 (June 2000), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/
stats/e_comm2.pdf.
24 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, FIGHTING CONSUMER FRAUD: NEW TOOLS
OF THE TRADE (Apr. 1998), at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/fraud97/index.html
(showing an example of recent FTC efforts to address the "new" consumer and
reevaluate the reach of existing consumer protection laws).
25 Arizona and Iowa are the only states that do not provide for a private right
of action.
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (containing only a broad and general definition in
section (n)). Deception constitutes a broader definition than fraud, thus, anything
that could be considered fraudulent behavior could also be considered deceptive.
Unfairness is not necessarily required for an act to be found deceptive. The two
elements operate independently. Unfairness is generally found when practices take
advantage of consumers. See The Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of
1994, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (defining the current FTC standard for an act that
constitutes "unfairness").
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expansive. 27 This broad definition of an unlawful practice is
expanded even further by federal court rulings that proof of intent,
negligence, fraud, or actual deception is not required to establish a
deceptive trade practice. a  The FTC's current standard for
determining a deceptive trade practice is that the act or practice must
be likely to deceive or mislead consumers acting reasonably under
the circumstances. 29 The FTC standard, unlike the federal court
standard, limits the protection afforded consumers to those who have
acted reasonably.
30
Many federal courts also agree that any business practice that
offends established public policy and is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, or causes substantial injury is an unfair
trade practice. 31 Federal courts have further noted that the reason for
such a broad definition is to ensure that the courts can react to the
endless creativity of those engaged in unfair trade practices. 32 Finally,
the federal courts, just as in the case of deceptive trade practices, do
not require proof of intent, negligence, or fraud to prove an unfair
trade practice claim. 33
27 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
28 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Amy Travel Serv. Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 574 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that intent is not required even for monetary redress); see also Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir. 1988)
(noting that "deceptiveness is often not a component of the unfairness inquiry"),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989).
29 In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984); see also Letter by
Chairman James C. Miller to Honorable John Dingell, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
30 Id.
3' Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5
(1972).
32 Id. at 240.
33 See id.; Amy Travel Serv., 875 F.2d at 564 (holding that intent is not
required, even for monetary redress); see also Orkin Exterminating, 849 F.2d at
1368. Regardless of the circuit, across the board there are readings that intent is not
a necessary component of deception. UDAP liability may be found when a
deceptive act results from negligence. See, e.g., Grove v. Huffman, 634 N.E.2d
1184, 1188 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); Brandon v. Winnett, No. O1AO1-9411-CH00529,
1995 WL 444385, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (holding that negligent
misrepresentation constitutes a UDAP violation); Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co.,
607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (111. 1992) (concluding that the standard for the UDAP states
that fraud is not required, but instead, there only need be proof that a practice has
the tendency to deceive).
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The FTC's 1994 Reauthorization Act codifies the current FTC
definition for unfair trade practices. 34 Specifically, the FTCA now
states that an unfair trade practice must be an act or practice that
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury, which cannot be
reasonably avoided and is not outweighed by the countervailing
benefits of the act or practice. 35 This statutory provision goes on to
state that the FTC may consider, but not exclusively rely on, a public
policy argument to establish an unfair trade practice. Again, even
though the FTC standard for unfairness is more restrictive than the
federal court standard, proof of intent, negligence, or fraud is not
required to establish an unfair trade practice.
The broad federal court and FTC definitions' incorporation of
unfair and deceptive trade practices into state UDAP statutes invites
victims of unlawful business practices to use the UDAP private right
of action to redress these wrongs. 38 The provisions providing for a
prevailing party's recovery of attorneys fees and costs are also a
significant incentive under the UDAP. 39 Essentially, this fees and
costs provision provides funding for private unfair or deceptive trade
practice lawsuits. 40  Absent this kind of fee-shifting statutory
provision, state UDAP statutes would not be privately enforced as
frequently. 41 Although many state UDAP statutes contain
idiosyncratic statutory provisions concerning the entitlement and
amount of attorney fees and costs awardable to a prevailing party, the
attractiveness of this kind of fee-shifting provision is not
compromised.42
14 Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, § 9, Pub. L. No. 103-
312, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000)); see also,
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1787-88 (reprint of the Senate hearings on the Act).
15 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
36 ld.
37 Amy Travel Serv., 875 F.2d at 575 (holding that intent is not required, even
for monetary redress); see also Orkin Exterminating Co., 849 F.2d at 1368 (noting
that "deceptiveness is often not a component of the unfairness inquiry").
31 Gilleran & Stadfeld, supra note 1, at 62.
39 id.
4 id.
4 Toward Greater Equality, supra note 6, at 1628.
42 See generally Debra E. Wax, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Actions Under
State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protections Acts, 35 A.L.R. 4th 12
(1985) (providing an overview of the wide number of cases in various states
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At first blush, there appears to be no reason why businesses
should not be able to take advantage of the prohibitions and remedies
afforded by state UDAP statutes. If businesses may use state UDAP
statutes, then the incentives in these statutes should apply to business
victims as well. A business's private right of action under a state
UDAP statute would provide protection for business owners - in
particular, small business owners.
43
III. The Business Plaintiff in State UDAP Lawsuits
Whether a business can sue another business under a state
UDAP statute hinges on the standing provisions of the various state
statutes.44 Of the forty-eight states that provide for a UDAP private
right of action, all define "who can sue" as either "a person" or "a
consumer" who is injured by an unfair or deceptive trade practice.45
At this point, the ease of broadly grouping states according to their
UDAP statutory provisions and case precedent ends. Whether a
business can sue another business for a UDAP violation completely
depends on how the state statute defines "a person" or "a consumer"
entitled to sue under the statute, and the state's courts' interpretation
of the UDAP provision. The remainder of this section will attempt to
group and sub-group all forty-eight states.
A group of fourteen states limits who can sue to a person or a
consumer who purchases or leases goods for personal, family, or
household use.4 Under these types of statutes, a business entity is
regarding attorneys fees and costs under deceptive trade or consumer protection
statutes).
43 Green, supra note 3, at B 1.
" See Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Business Standing Under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act: An Attempt to Resolve the Confusion, 17 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 71, 71
(1996) (discussing a business's standing under the Illinois statute).
45 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-88-113(f) (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-113(1)(a)-(c) (2002); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2533(a) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-373(a) (2002); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (West 2002);
MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW I § 13-408(a) (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.911 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10(I) (2002); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. § 349(h) (Consol. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.12 (West 2002); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(1)
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A) (Michie 2002).
46 Fourteen states (and the District of Columbia) that follow this construction
include: Alabama, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
2003]
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essentially unable to sue another business for an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.47
Four other states grant a UDAP private right of action to "a
person" or "a consumer," but do not include businesses in that
48definition. Absent the inclusion of businesses in the statutory
definition, a business entity does not appear to have standing to bring
a UDAP cause of action against another business.
49
An additional group of thirty states grants a UDAP private
right of action to "a person" or "a consumer" and specifically
includes business entities within the reach of that provision. 50 This
would seem to permit a lawsuit by one business against another
business, however, within these states, the issue of business against
business UDAP lawsuits has not been presented and decided by any
court.
51
ALA. CODE § 8-19-3(2) (2002); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(d) (West 2002); IND.
CODE § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(1) (Banks-
Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213(1) (West 2002); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1) (West 2002); MT. CODE
ANN. § 30-14-133 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (West 2002); 73
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a) (2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-3(2) (2002); Wis. STAT. § 421.301(17) (2002); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-204, 14-206 (Michie 2002); see also Charlotte E. Thomas,
The Quicksand of Private Actions Under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices
Act: Strict Liability, Treble Damages, and Six Years to Sue, 102 DICK. L. REV. 1,
10-11 (1997).
47 See Thomas, supra note 46, at n.73-74 (citing a number of cases holding
that non-consumers are precluded from bringing suit under statutes containing this
language); see also Clinton, Jr., supra note 44, at 7 1.
48 These states include Alaska, Nevada, New York, and West Virginia. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.531(a), 50.561(4) (Michie 2001); NEV. REV. STAT.
598.0916, 598.0917 (2002); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (Consol. 2002); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6-102(b) (2002).
49 See generally Clinton, Jr., supra note 44 (discussing businesses' standing
under the Illinois statute, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a(a)).
50 Such states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Michigan, New Hampshire, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-88-102(4), 88-113(f) (Michie 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2531(5)
(2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 501.203(7) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(a) (Law. Co-
op. 2002).
5 This group includes Arkansas, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Carolina, and South Dakota. See statutes cited supra note 50.
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The twenty-four remaining states are difficult to categorize
because of indigenous and peculiar state court opinions addressing
the issues of a business suing another business under the relevant
state UDAP statute. Several state courts have definitively decided
that business entities have a UDAP cause of action. 52 Colorado
presents a good example of this group of states. The Colorado statute
permits "any person" to sue for a UDAP violation. 53 The Colorado
Supreme Court defines "any person" to mean a person who can
establish that the defendant in the lawsuit engaged in an unfair or
deceptive trade practice in the course of the defendant's business,
which significantly impacts the public as actual or potential
customers of the defendant. 54 Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court
chose to define who can sue under its UDAP statute by defining not
who a plaintiff may be, but rather what a plaintiff must prove. The
key to a business suing another business for a UDAP violation in
Colorado is whether the business plaintiff can prove up an unfair or
deceptive trade practice by the defendant and also show some kind of
public interest in permitting the business plaintiff to recover for the
UDAP violation.
Tennessee courts reached the same result that the Colorado
court did, albeit in a different manner. The Tennessee UDAP statute
was amended in 1989 to include "other persons" within the definition
of who can sue for a UDAP violation. 57 The Tennessee UDAP statute
also specifically states that one of the purposes of the UDAP statute
is to protect legitimate businesses. After several lower court
decisions denied business entities standing to bring a UDAP claim,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in ATS Southeast, Inc. v. Carrier
Corp., ruled that the term "other persons" in the UDAP statute
allowed business entities to sue other businesses for unfair and
52 See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998) (determining
whether a business has a cause of action under COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-102(6)
(2002)).
53 COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2) (2002).
54 Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998).
55 Id.
56 Fiberglass Component Prod. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 948,
961 (D. Colo. 1997).
57 ATS Southeast, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 18 S.W.3d 626, 628 (Tenn. 2000)
(citing TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 47-18-109(a)(4)(A), (B), (D) (1995 & Supp. 1999)).
58 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-18-102(2) (2001).
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deceptive trade practices.59
The way that the Tennessee Supreme Court came to its ruling
in ATS Southeast, Inc. illustrates the problems many courts have with
this question. The Tennessee court focused on the plain language of
the 1989 amendment to the Tennessee UDAP statute and concluded
that the job of the court is "to say ... and obey" the clear language of
a statute. 6' The court went on to criticize the lower courts for
ignoring the intent and specific language of the Tennessee UDAP
statute and for ruling that since a corporation is not consumer it
cannot sue for UDAP violations. 62 Importantly, however, the
Tennessee Supreme Court's decision is somewhat contradictory,
considering other provisions of the Tennessee UDAP statute, which
define consumers as natural persons, and limit the term "goods,"
when used in the statute, to those acquired for personal, family, or
household use. 63 The Tennessee Supreme Court effectively ruled that
the 1989 amendments to the UDAP statute were intended to trump
other statutory provisions, which leaned towards more restrictive
application of the UDAP statute. In the end, the law of Tennessee
does permit one business to sue another business for unfair and
deceptive trade practices.
64
In contrast to the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision
broadening the scope of suits under its UDAP statute, is the Maryland
District Court's treatment of business entities in UDAP lawsuits.
65
Maryland is a state that defines "any person" in the UDAP statute to
59 ATS Southeast, 18 S.W. 3d at 630.
60 See ATS Southeast, 18 S.W. 3d at 627-30.
61 id.
62 id.
63 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-103(2) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
103(5) (2001). "Goods" means any tangible chattels leased, bought, or otherwise
obtained for use by an individual for personal, family, or household purposes or a
franchise, distributorship agreement, or similar business opportunity. The court in
ATS Southeast, however, makes no mention of this definition, and looks solely at
the language of § 47-18-109(a)(1) ("[a]ny person . . . may bring an action [] to
recover actual damages") and § 47-18-109(4) ("[iun determining whether treble
damages should be awarded, the trial court may consider, among other things: ...
(c) [t]he damage to the consumer or other person."). ATS Southeast, 18 S.W.3d at
628-29.
64 Jeffrey L. Reed, Comment: The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act: An
Overview, 58 TENN. L. REV. 455, 478 (1991).
65 See Penn-Plax Inc. v. Schultz, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. Md. 1997).
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66specifically include business entities. In addition, Maryland, much
like Tennessee, also defines "consumer goods" in the UDAP statute
to mean goods purchased and used for primarily personal, family, and
household use. However, unlike Tennessee, the Maryland District
Court ruled that a business entity could not sue another business for a
UDAP violation. 68 The Maryland District Court held that if the
Maryland legislature had intended to include competitors within the
reach of the UDAP statute, it would have specifically stated that.69
The court curiously based this reasoning on legislative history from
Connecticut, rather than Maryland, and further posited that the term
''any person" was really intended to define who could be a defendant
in a UDAP claim.
7 °
By way of further comparison, the Michigan federal courts
produced conflicting decisions when faced with the same question
presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, in 1990's Winn Oil Co. v. American
Way Service Corp., ruled that business entities may fall within the
meaning of a person under the UDAP statute, but could not maintain
such a claim because the legislature intended the statute to protect
only consumers in transactions with businesses for personal, family,
or household goods.71 However, in Action Auto Glass v. Auto Glass
Specialists, in 2001, the District Court for the Southern District of
Michigan ruled that the UDAP statutory definition of any person
includes businesses as both plaintiffs and defendants and would
permit a business entity to sue even a competitor for unfair and
deceptive trade practices. 72 Michigan consumers and businesses still
wait for a decision to resolve this conflict.
Minnesota presents a different spin on the issue of whether a
business can sue another business under a state UDAP statute. The
66 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 13-101(h) (2002) ("'Person' includes an
individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, two or
more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity.").
67 Id. § 13-101(d).
68 Penn-Plax, Inc., 988 F. Supp. at 911.
69 Id. at 910.
'o Id. at 911.
71 Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 736 F. Supp. 746, 757 (E.D. Mich.
1990).
72 Action Auto Glass v. Auto Glass Specialists, 134 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903
(W.D. Mich. 2001).
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Minnesota Supreme Court, in Ly v. Nystrom, first noted that the term
"consumer" is not in the Minnesota UDAP statute.73 The court
hastened to add, however, that the clear purpose of the Minnesota
statute is to protect consumers.74 The court noted that "[t]he intrastate
practice of fraud has grown into a field of great profit and great
damage both to individual citizens and to honest businessmen." The
court concluded that the plaintiffs purchase of a restaurant was akin
to a consumer transaction and would therefore permit the plaintiff to
bring a UDAP statutory claim against the defendant restaurant
seller.76 This analysis seems to indicate that the Minnesota Supreme
Court believed that when a business acts like a consumer, it may sue
another business for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
A Virginia case demonstrates how idiosyncratic the court
rulings on this issue can be. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, in H.D. Oliver Funeral Apartments, Inc. v.
Dignity Funeral Services, Inc., was faced with a plaintiff's claim that
the defendant published a false and misleading advertisement. 77 The
court found that the plaintiff business's claim constituted a
"consumer transaction" under Virginia's UDAP statute, yet the court
also ruled that a competitor business did not have standing to bring an
unfair or deceptive trade practice claim. 78 The court based this ruling
on its application of the "400 year old 'mischief rule' of statutory
construction" applicable in Virginia.79 The "mischief rule" requires
that every statute must be read to promote the ability to remedy the
mischief at which the statute is directed.8° In this context, a false and
misleading advertisement would seem to fall into the category of
mischief at which Virginia's unfair and deceptive trade practice
73 Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 310.
17 See H.D. Oliver Funeral Apartments, Inc. v. Dignity Funeral Services, Inc.,
964 F. Supp. 1033, 1033-34 (E.D. Va. 1997).
78 Id. at 1039; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-198 (Michie 2002). "'Consumer
Transaction' means: ... (2) [t]ransactions involving the advertisement, offer or sale
to an individual of a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of
money or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he
has not been previously engaged." Id.
79 H.D. Oliver, 964 F. Supp. at 1038.
80 Id. at 1039.
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statute is directed. However, the court, noting that the Virginia
UDAP statute was intended to be liberally construed to promote fair
dealing between suppliers and consumers, concluded that a lawsuit
by one competing business against another is not within the reach of
the Virginia statute.81
This survey and comparison of state UDAP statutes and the
court opinions construing these statutes reveal some interesting data.
First, the issue of business against business UDAP statutory claims is
not a widely litigated issue. Second, the only consensus that can be
drawn from this review is that some of the court opinions contain
internal conflicts and conflict with other court opinions. Third, many
state UDAP statutes contain inconsistent provisions even after
clarifying amendments have been enacted. These inconsistent and
even contradictory statutory provisions provide little guidance to
courts or consumers trying to sort out statutory coverage. Finally, the
idea of one business suing another business for unfair and deceptive
trade practices using the state UDAP statute seems foreign to many
jurists.
IV. Conclusion
Where does the foregoing analysis of the various state UDAP
statues and unsettling case law leave the question of whether UDAP
statutes can be used to protect "consumer businesses?" Perhaps a
study of the Florida UDAP statute presents the state legislative and
state court roles in extending UDAP protection to businesses. One
case study is instructive of the role of both state legislatures and state
courts in resolving the issue of whether a UDAP statutory claim is
available to a business in a lawsuit against another business.
The Florida UDAP statute, which is modeled after the FTCA,
82prohibits deceptive and unfair trade practices in trade or commerce.
In 1993, the Florida UDAP was amended to include a "firm,
association, joint venture, partnership ... corporation and.any other
group or combination" within its definition of a "consumer. On its
face, it appears that business entities are consumers under the UDAP
statute. Florida thus grants a private right of action to a "consumer
who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of [the statute]" and
specifically authorizes that "such consumer may recover actual
81 Id.
82 FLA. STAT. ch. 501.203 (2002).
83 Id. ch. 501.203(7).
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damages, plus attorney's fees and court costs . . . ,,84 From this
statutory language it appears that a business would possess a claim
for deceptive and unfair trade practices. In addition, the Florida
UDAP statute explicitly states that a purpose of the Florida law is to
protect businesses and foster fair competition and that a UDAP claim
is in addition to any other statutory or common law cause of action.
85
In combination, these statutory provisions clearly suggest that
businesses have the right to bring an unfair and deceptive trade
practice claim against other businesses.
However, many Florida judges disagreed. Relying on
inapplicable case law, reluctant to see through the intended purpose
of the UDAP statute, or hesitant to recognize that both consumers and
businesses need protection from deceptive trade practices, Florida
courts have produced untidy precedent. The District Court for the
Southern District of Florida ruled on the first two cases to test the
impact of the 1993 amendments to the Florida UDAP statute. Florida
federal courts decided, in Nieman v. Dryclean USA Franchise
Company, Inc.86 and Bell Avon, Inc. v. Petroleum Protective Systems,
Inc., that a properly pled unfair and deceptive trade practice claim is
available to business entities. Both courts relied heavily on the
amended section of the Florida UDAP statute, which lists the
protection of legitimate business enterprises as an intended purpose89
of the statute. Then the District Court for the Middle District of
Florida addressed the same issue in Tampa Bay Storm, Inc. v. Arena
Football League, Inc.90 In this case, a third federal court agreed that
the 1993 amendments to the Florida UDAP statute permitted business
entities to sue another business for unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 91 This court not only relied on the amended purpose section
of the Florida UDAP statute, but also the amended definition of
84 FLA. STAT. ch. 501.211(2) (2002).
85 Id. ch. 501.202(2).
86 178 F.3d 1128 (1lth Cir. 1999).
87 No. 96-933-CIV-Moore, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 1997) (on file with
author).
88 Id.
" FLA. STAT. ch. § 501.202(2) (2002).
90 No. 96-29-CIV-T-17C, 1998 WL 182418 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1998).
9' Id. at *7.
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consumer, which specifically included business organizations. 92
Perhaps the most interesting case interpreting the 1993
amendments to the Florida UDAP statute is Florida Software
Systems, Inc. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation.93 In this
lawsuit by a medical claims management business against a health
service provider business, the defendant brought a counterclaim that
the plaintiff used unfair and deceptive trade practices in its claims
management business. 94 The District Court in the Middle District of
Florida again ruled that a health service provider business would have
standing to bring a UDAP claim under Florida law against a claims
management business.95 Based on these four cases decided between
1997 and 1999, the federal courts seemed to think the Florida UDAP
statute, as amended in 1993, applied to business against business
lawsuits.
As these federal court decisions were being decided, another
judge in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
published a contrary opinion in the case of Big Tomato v. Tasty
Concepts, Inc.96 The court cited two Eleventh Circuit cases97 in ruling
that Florida's UDAP statute only applies to "consumers," and not to a
business in a lawsuit against a competitor for damages. 98 In one of
the cited cases, M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., using the
reasoning from a Florida state appellate court decision, 99 the court
held that a damages action under the UDAP statute can only be
maintained by a plaintiff who has not been previously engaged in the
business involved in the lawsuit. 100 Finally, the court acknowledged
that the 1993 amendments to the Florida UDAP statute actually
expanded the definition of consumers to include businesses and
corporations, but that such amendment did not alter the prohibition
92 Id. at *8.
93 46 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
94 Id. at 1280-81.
9' Id. at 1286.
96 972 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
97 See Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1994);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11 th Cir. 1990).
98 See Big Tomato, 972 F. Supp. at 663-64.
99 Darrell Swanson Consol. Servs. v. Davis, 433 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
100 M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1494.
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against businesses suing competitors under the statute.'01 A few years
later, in 1999, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
agreed with the court in Big Tomato and barred use of the statute bv a
competitor in Nassau v. Unimotorcyclists Society of America, Inc.
Finally, in 1999 the Florida District Court of Appeals heard
the issue for the first time in Warren Technology, Inc. v. Hines
Interests Limited Partnership.10 3 In this case, the court ruled that the
plaintiff business did not have a UDAP claim against the defendant
business because the plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to the
effective date of the 1993 amendments to the Florida UDAP
statute.' °4 The court held that regardless of whether the pre- or post-
1993 amended version of the UDAP statute applied, neither version
authorized this particular business's claim against another
business.105 The court, noting that the plaintiff corporation would fit
the 1993 amended definition of a consumer under the UDAP statute,
posited that only when such a business plaintiff is acting in the
capacity of a consumer in a business-to-business transaction would a
UDAP claim be permissible. 10 6 In this case, the court described the
status of the plaintiff business as a producer or manufacturer, and not
a consumer.
Not unlike other states, the Florida courts have clearly
struggled to produce consistent precedent concerning a business
entity's right to sue another business for unfair and deceptive trade
practices. With the conflicting federal and state court opinions in
mind, the Florida legislature amended the UDAP statute by first
specifically including "business ... or any other commercial entity,
however denominated" in the definition of a consumer. 108 The
legislature then went on to amend the private right of action under the
UDAP by replacing the term "consumer" with the word "person" to
describe who can bring an unfair and deceptive trade practice
101 See M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1494.
'0' 59 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (M.D. Ha. 1999).
103 733 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
' Id. at 1147.
105 id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 FLA. STAT. ch. 501.203(7) (2002).
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claim.'0 9 Under Florida law, the legal definition of a person includes
a business entity.' 10 With these amendments, the Florida legislature
adopted the case precedent authorizing a business entity, regardless
of its status in the transaction, to sue for damages from unfair and
deceptive trade practices by another business.
UDAP statutes in thirty states are currently equipped to
include a private right of action by one business against another
business for deceptive and unfair trade practices. In those states, the
question becomes whether or not the courts have the will to step up
and sanction unlawful and deceptive business practices, regardless of
who is the particular victim or perpetrator. The answer depends in
part on courts adopting a new construct, which states that businesses
can be victims too!
Among the other states, which restrict the application of
UDAP statutes to consumers and typical consumer transactions,
Florida demonstrates that even at a most unlikely time, state
legislatures can be moved to include businesses as plaintiffs in unfair
and deceptive trade practice claims. When state legislatures or state
courts refuse to grant standing to small businesses to pursue a UDAP
claim this is not measured deregulation or judicial restraint, but rather
avoidance and abdication. Today's small business is part of today's
consumer. Effective consumer protection demands that consumers
and businesses be treated alike under UDAP statutes.
'0o Id. ch. 501.211(1).
"0o Id. ch. 1.01(3).
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